A signed list of nexus market mirrors

A signed list of nexus market mirrors is a text file that carries a set of onion strings alongside a cryptographic signature. It is the one path on the site with a check that does not rely on the surface it arrived on.

What it is

A signed list of nexus market mirrors is a text file that carries a set of onion strings together with a cryptographic signature made by a key the reader knows something about. The reader downloads the file, checks the signature against the key, reads the strings out of the file, and pastes one into the tor browser. The path is longer than every other path in this rubric, and it is the only one that gives the reader a check they can perform without trusting the surface the file came in on.

The signature does not prove the list is fresh. It does not prove the mirrors on the list are open right now. It does not prove the key holder is the operator of the market. What it proves is that the run of bytes in the file left the key holder's hand unchanged. That is a smaller claim than most readers assume, and it is still by far the strongest claim any path on this site can make.

What verification really shows

Bytes

The bytes in the signed part of the file are the bytes the key holder signed. A single character added or removed in a text editor after signing breaks the check.

Key identity

The signature was made by the key with a given fingerprint. The reader has to have decided in advance whether that fingerprint is the one they trust for this market.

Time

A signature often carries a timestamp of when the signing was done. A very old timestamp is a sign the file has not been updated since, whether or not it verifies.

Expiry

A signing key can expire, and a verified signature made by a key past its expiry is a soft warning that most gpg tools flag but do not refuse.

What the signature does not prove

• That the mirrors on the list are answering right now. The list is a claim about what the key holder considers the mirrors to be, not a probe.
• That the key holder is who the reader thinks they are. Fingerprint trust has to come from somewhere, and that somewhere is outside the file itself.
• That the file has not been superseded. A newer signed file from the same key is what supersedes it, not a note on a page.
• That the download surface is honest. A signed file served alongside a bad copy makes the honest reader do the verification and the trusting reader take the bad copy.

Lifeline

What the path keeps, what it drops

The path keeps the exact bytes of the strings the key holder signed. It keeps the ability to prove those bytes came from that key. It keeps the ability to detect any change made after signing. These properties are what set this path apart from every other path on the site. No other path can do them.

The path drops any warmth the key holder might have put around the strings in an informal note. A comment above the list is either signed together with it or not part of the check. It also drops the reader's ability to be lazy. Every step of the verification has to be done or the signature is doing no work. A file that says verified as a banner across the top is a page, not a check.

What to check after verifying

• The signature verified with the fingerprint the reader trusts for this market, not simply that a signature verified with something.
• The signed part of the file, not a header or a footer around it, is the part that carries the mirror strings. Some files sign only a summary block above the strings.
• The list is either the most recent one signed by that key, or the reader has a note explaining why an older one is in use.
• The strings pasted into the browser are the ones in the signed file, not the ones the reader remembered were in the file. Retyping from memory undoes the check.

Engagement

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